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Abstract
In the case when alternatives are ranked by several equivalent criteria on the scale of three grades (bad, average,
good) we develop the axiomatics of preference functions for the superposition of the Borda and threshold preference
orders and present the explicit formula for the evaluation of the enumerating preference function.
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1. Introduction
In practical problems of ranking large sets (e.g., consisting of several millions of alternatives), the crucial feature
is the computation of the ordinal number of an alternative in the resulting ranking. The procedure of ranking under
consideration can be made more eﬀective provided a utility function, coherent with the rankning, is found in a suitable
form. Among numerous ranking procedures known in the literature we consider three methods based on Borda’s and
threshold preference orders and their superposition.
The simplest method of ranking alternatives over several equivalent criteria is the Borda rule of summation of
individual ranks of alternatives. According to it, an alternative x is (Borda) preferred to an alternative y provided the
total rank of x, which is the sum of individual ranks, is greater than the total rank of y. The deﬁciency of this method
is that it produces massive sets with equal total ranks, and so, it is insensitive to the input information. Moreover, it is
of compensatory nature: low individual ranks can be compensated by high individual ranks in the resulting ranking.
In this paper, we consider the technically simple case when alternatives are estimated by means of three grades
(i.e., individual ranks): 1 meaning ‘bad’, 2 meaning ‘average’, and 3 meaning ‘good’. A more subtle ranking of
alternatives, as compared to the Borda ranking, can be given by applying the threshold rule [4, 5]: an alternative x
is (threshold) preferred to an alternative y if and only if either the number of ‘bads’ for x is less than those for y, or
the numbers of ‘bads’ are equal for both alternatives and the number of ‘averages’ for x is less than those for y. This
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method is extremely sensitive to the input information and is of noncompensatory nature: low individual ranks cannot
be compensated by (any numbers of) high individual ranks in the resulting ranking.
The aim of this paper is to study the intermediate semicompensatory ranking procedure, which is the mixture (i.e.,
the superposition) of the two methods above, Borda’s and threshold’s. We say that an alternative x is (superposition-
ally) preferred to y if and only if either the sum of individual ranks for x is greater than the sum of individual ranks
for y (as in Borda’s rule), or the sums of individual ranks for x and y are equal and the number of ‘bads’ for x is less
than the number of ‘bads’ for y (as in the threshold rule).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we deﬁne the superposition of two preference orders on a set of
alternatives and in Section 3 we recall the Borda and threshold preference orders. Section 4 is devoted to the main
results: the axiomatics of preference functions for the superposition of the Borda and threshold preference orders
(Theorem 1) and the explicit formula for the enumerating preference function (Theorem 2). In Appendix we exhibit
examples of the Borda, threshold and their superposition rankings.
2. Superposition of preference orders
Let X be a ﬁnite set (the set of alternatives) and P ⊂ X × X be a preference (or weak) order on X [6], i.e., P is
irreﬂexive ((x, x)  P for all x ∈ X), transitive ((x, y) ∈ P and (y, z) ∈ P imply (x, z) ∈ P) and negatively transitive
((x, y)  P and (y, z)  P imply (x, z)  P). The inclusion (x, y) ∈ P is interpreted as ‘x is P-preferred to y’. The
indiﬀerence relation IP on X, induced by P, is deﬁned as the set of all pairs (x, y) ∈ X × X such that (x, y)  P and
(y, x)  P. Thus, (x, y) ∈ IP means that x and y are P-indiﬀerent. The relation IP is an equivalence relation on X.
A typical example of a preference order is as follows. Given a nonconstant function F : X → R, let P(F) be the
set of all pairs (x, y) ∈ X × X such that F(x) > F(y). Then P(F) is a preference order on X, and (x, y) ∈ IP(F) if and
only if F(x) = F(y). The function F is called a preference (or utility) function for P(F) and the binary relation P(F)
is called F-representable.
Let P and Q be two preference orders on X. The relation P ∗Q on X, deﬁned by P ∗Q = P∪ (IP ∩Q), is called the
superposition of P and Q (in this order). In other words, x is (P∗Q)-preferred to y if and only if either x is P-preferred
to y, or x and y are P-indiﬀerent and x is Q-preferred to y. It is known [1] that P ∗ Q is a preference order on X,
IP∗Q = IP ∩ IQ and (P ∗ Q) ∗ R = P ∗ (Q ∗ R) for a preference order R on X. However, P ∗ Q  Q ∗ P in general.
3. Borda’s and threshold preference orders
In this paper, we assume that alternatives from X are estimated by means of the three-graded scale: 1 (bad),
2 (average), and 3 (good), i.e., X is identiﬁed with the set {1, 2, 3}n of all n-dimensional vectors x = (x1, . . . , xn) with
n ≥ 3 and components xi ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Such vector-grades may be interpreted as expert grades, questionnaire data, etc.
Given x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X = {1, 2, 3}n and i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we denote by vi(x) the multiplicity of grade i in the vector x
and set S (x) = x1 + · · · + xn. Clearly,
v1(x) + v2(x) + v3(x) = n and S (x) = v1(x) + 2v2(x) + 3v3(x).
Given x, y ∈ X, we write (x, y) ∈ B if S (x) > S (y). The relation B is a preference order on X, called the Borda
preference order [9]. Note that B produces a ‘coarse’ ranking of X in the sense that indiﬀerence classes of alternatives
x ∈ X, given by x = {y ∈ X : S (y) = S (x)}, are rather massive (see Appendix for an example of B).
A more subtle ranking of X is given by the threshold preference order ([2]–[5]). Given x, y ∈ X and i ∈ {1, 2},
we write (x, y) ∈ Vi if vi(x) < vi(y). Each relation Vi is a preference order on X such that (x, y) ∈ IVi if and only if
vi(x) = vi(y). The superposition V = V1 ∗ V2 is called the threshold preference order on X (note that it is a particular
case of the leximin [2, 8]). More explicitly, (x, y) ∈ V if and only if either v1(x) < v1(y), or v1(x) = v1(y) and
v2(x) < v2(y). The indiﬀerence relation IV = IV1 ∩ IV2 consists of those pairs (x, y) ∈ X × X, for which v1(x) = v1(y)
and v2(x) = v2(y) (and so, v3(x) = v3(y)), i.e., x and y can be trasformed into each other by a permutation of their
coordinates. An example of the threshold preference order V is presented in Appendix.
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4. Results: axioms and enumerating preference functions
Let P = B ∗ V be the superposition of the Borda preference order B and the threshold preference order V . Then P
is also a preference order on X, and we have P = B ∗ V1 and IP = IV . In other words, (x, y) ∈ P if and only if either
S (x) > S (y), or S (x) = S (y) and v1(x) < v1(y). Note that V ∗ B = V (and so, B ∗ V  V ∗ B). An example of such
superposition preference order P is given in Appendix.
Our ﬁrst result addresses the representability of the relation P.
Theorem 1. A function F : X = {1, 2, 3}n → R is a preference function for the superposition relation P = B ∗ V
(i.e., P = P(F)) if and only if, given x, y ∈ X, the following four conditions (axioms) are satisﬁed:
(A.1) v1(x) = v1(y) and v3(x) = v3(y) imply F(x) = F(y);
(A.2) v1(x) + 1 = v1(y) and v3(x) + 1 = v3(y) imply F(x) > F(y);
(A.3) v3(y) = 0 and v1(x) + 1 = v1(y) + v3(x) imply F(x) > F(y);
(A.4) v1(y) = 0 and v1(x) + v3(y) + 1 = v3(x) imply F(x) > F(y). .
A simple preference function for P is given by F(x) = nS (x) − v1(x), x ∈ X.
In order to present our second result, we recall the construction of the canonical ranking of X, generated by a
preference order P on X [7]. For a subset Y ⊂ X, we denote by π(Y) the set of most P-preferred alternatives from Y ,
i.e., those y ∈ Y such that (x, y)  P for all x ∈ Y . We set X′1 = π(X) and, inductively, if k ≥ 2 and nonempty disjoint
subsets X′1, . . . , X
′
k−1 of X such that X
′
1∪. . .∪X′k−1  X are already determined, then we set X′k = π(X\(X′1∪. . .∪X′k−1)).
Since X is ﬁnite, there exists a unique positive integer s = sP(X) such that X =
⋃s
k=1 X
′
k (disjoint union). The value
s is equal to the cardinality of the quotient set X/IP. Setting Xk = X′s−k+1 for k = 1, 2, . . . , s, we get the family{Xk}sk=1 = X/IP of indiﬀerence classes (the canonical ranking of X), partitioning X, which has the following property:
given x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ P if and only if there exist integers 1 ≤ k1 < k2 ≤ s such that x ∈ Xk2 and y ∈ Xk1 . Also,
(x, y) ∈ IP if and only if x, y ∈ Xk for some integer 1 ≤ k ≤ s.
Deﬁne a function N : X → {1, 2, . . . , s} by the following rule: given x ∈ X, there exists a unique integer 1 ≤ k ≤ s
such that x ∈ Xk, and so, we set N(x) = k. Thus, x ∈ Xk = XN(x) = {x ∈ X : N(x) = k}. The function N is called
the enumerating preference function for P (it is well-deﬁned, uniquely determined and surjective preference function
for P [2]). Any other preference function F : X → R, representing P, can be expressed as follows: there exists an
increasing function f : {1, 2, . . . , s} → R such that F(x) = f (N(x)) for all x ∈ X.
In the next theorem we determine the enumerating preference function for P = B ∗ V explicitly. In this theorem
[a] denotes the greatest integer, which does not exceed a. Note that if X = {1, 2, 3}n and P = B ∗ V , then IP = IV , and
so, by [3, Lemma 1], s = sP(X) = sV (X) = (n + 2)(n + 1)/2.
Theorem 2. A function N maps X = {1, 2, 3}n onto {1, 2, . . . , s} and is the enumerating preference function for the
superposition preference order P = B ∗ V on X if and only if it is given for x ∈ X as follows: if n ≤ S (x) ≤ 2n, then
N(x) =
[
S (x) − n
2
]
·
[
S (x) − n + 1
2
]
+ n + 1 − v1(x),
and if 2n + 1 ≤ S (x) ≤ 3n, then
N(x) =
[
S (x) − n
2
]
·
[
S (x) − n + 1
2
]
+ n − (S (x) − 2n + 1) · (S (x) − 2n − 2)
2
− v1(x).
.
Appendix
Here we present examples of rankings of the set X = {1, 2, 3}n with n = 5 in ascending Borda B-, threshold V-
and superposition P-preference, where P = B ∗ V . Each vector x ∈ X below is written (for the sake of brevity) in
the form (x1, x2, . . . , x5)k with x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ x5, which represents the indiﬀerence class Xk with k = N(x) and
N : X → {1, 2, . . . , s} being the corresponding enumerating preference function.
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1. For the Borda preference order B we have s = sB(X) = 2n+ 1 = 11 and N(x) = S (x)− n+ 1 = S (x)− 4, and so,
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1)1, (1, 1, 1, 1, 2)2, (1, 1, 1, 1, 3)3, (1, 1, 1, 2, 2)3, (1, 1, 1, 2, 3)4, (1, 1, 2, 2, 2)4,
(1, 1, 1, 3, 3)5, (1, 1, 2, 2, 3)5, (1, 2, 2, 2, 2)5, (1, 1, 2, 3, 3)6, (1, 2, 2, 2, 3)6, (2, 2, 2, 2, 2)6,
(1, 1, 3, 3, 3)7, (1, 2, 2, 3, 3)7, (2, 2, 2, 2, 3)7, (1, 2, 3, 3, 3)8, (2, 2, 2, 3, 3)8,
(1, 3, 3, 3, 3)9, (2, 2, 3, 3, 3)9, (2, 3, 3, 3, 3)10, (3, 3, 3, 3, 3)11.
2. If V is the threshold preference order, then s = sV (X) = (n + 2)(n + 1)/2 = 21 and, by [2, Theorem 3.1],
N(x) =
(n + 2 − v1(x)) · (n + 1 − v1(x))
2
− v2(x) = (7 − v1(x)) · (6 − v1(x))2 − v2(x),
and so, we have
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1)1, (1, 1, 1, 1, 2)2, (1, 1, 1, 1, 3)3, (1, 1, 1, 2, 2)4, (1, 1, 1, 2, 3)5, (1, 1, 1, 3, 3)6, (1, 1, 2, 2, 2)7,
(1, 1, 2, 2, 3)8, (1, 1, 2, 3, 3)9, (1, 1, 3, 3, 3)10, (1, 2, 2, 2, 2)11, (1, 2, 2, 2, 3)12, (1, 2, 2, 3, 3)13, (1, 2, 3, 3, 3)14,
(1, 3, 3, 3, 3)15, (2, 2, 2, 2, 2)16, (2, 2, 2, 2, 3)17, (2, 2, 2, 3, 3)18, (2, 2, 3, 3, 3)19, (2, 3, 3, 3, 3)20, (3, 3, 3, 3, 3)21.
3. For the superposition preference order P = B∗V we have s = sP(X) = (n+2)(n+1)/2 = 21 and, by Theorem 2,
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1)1, (1, 1, 1, 1, 2)2, (1, 1, 1, 1, 3)3, (1, 1, 1, 2, 2)4, (1, 1, 1, 2, 3)5, (1, 1, 2, 2, 2)6, (1, 1, 1, 3, 3)7,
(1, 1, 2, 2, 3)8, (1, 2, 2, 2, 2)9, (1, 1, 2, 3, 3)10, (1, 2, 2, 2, 3)11, (2, 2, 2, 2, 2)12, (1, 1, 3, 3, 3)13, (1, 2, 2, 3, 3)14,
(2, 2, 2, 2, 3)15, (1, 2, 3, 3, 3)16, (2, 2, 2, 3, 3)17, (1, 3, 3, 3, 3)18, (2, 2, 3, 3, 3)19, (2, 3, 3, 3, 3)20, (3, 3, 3, 3, 3)21.
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